“The two processes of globalization and
regionalization are articulated within the same larger process of global
structural transformation…”
— Björn Hettne, “Globalization, the New Regionalism and East Asia,”
Globalism and Regionalism. [1]
Strategic landscapes are radically changing. No
longer does a person’s country represent the core of citizenship or
identity. Today, a new murky world is dawning, one that advocates global
governance [2] as the portent to humanity’s social, political, and
economic future. Indeed, in this post-Cold War environment,
“nation-states” – like the societies they serve and accommodate – find
themselves in a relentless swell of transformation. National interests
give way to global loyalties, just as world citizenship is touted as
preferable to the narrow views of nationalism; no individual, corporation,
or country is immune to this revolution. Welcome to “globalization,” where
everyone is either a pawn or a player.
As an end to itself, the concept of globalization
seems to rest on one central pillar: the consolidation of power. No matter
what stripe or ideology globalization comes packaged in, this singular
component cannot be denied. And in a society where “power begets power,” a
global system, by definition, has the capability to expand this
characteristic to new levels.
Politically, globalization represents the
leveraging of power beyond that found in any one nation. Using the clichés
of global governance, we would call this a “new world civilization,” one
that’s built with international management in mind. Mikhail Gorbachev, the
last true master of the Soviet style of centralized power explains, “The
time has come to develop integrated global policies.” [3]
But political globalization is not an overnight
game. We don’t stop work Friday afternoon, take a break over the weekend,
and poof, find ourselves on Monday morning immersed in global governance.
Rather, this macro-political transformation is the product of generations
of changes, bumps and corrections, and decades of decisive planning.
Already in 1945, leading socialist Scott Nearing penned,
“A world society cannot be haphazard. Since
there are no precedents, it cannot be traditional at this stage in its
development. It can only be deliberative and experimental, planned and
built up with particular objectives…” [4]
Much more recently, Trilateral Commission
co-founder Zbigniew Brzezinski espoused similar notions, albeit with an
American-focused bent. In his book, The Grand Chessboard: American
Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives, the former National Security
Advisor maintains that America’s purpose for global engagement is “that of
forging an enduring framework of global geopolitical cooperation” and to
“unapologetically” position itself as the arbitrator of “global
management.” [5] Capping off this assertion, Brzezinski closes with these
sobering words, “Geostrategic success in that cause would represent a
fitting legacy of America’s role as the first, only, and last truly global
superpower.” [6]
Jim Garrison, founder and President of the
Gorbachev Foundation/USA (at the behest of Mikhail Gorbachev), [7]
likewise sees America as the forging element in globalization.
“…America must consciously view itself as a
transitional empire, one whose destiny at this moment is to act as
midwife to a democratically governed global system. Its great challenge
is not to dominate but to catalyze. It must use its great strength and
democratic heritage to establish integrating institutions and mechanisms
to manage the emerging global system so that its own power is subsumed
by the very edifice it helps to build.
President Wilson established the League of
Nations out of the ashes of World War I. President Roosevelt and Truman
established a new international order after World War II. America must
now build the third iteration of global governance. If it attains this
level of greatness, it could become the final empire, for it will
have bequeathed to the world a democratic and integrated global system
in which empire will no longer have a place or perform a role.” [8]
[italics in original]
Nearing, Brzezinski, and Garrison all point to
the reality of internationalism – it’s not accidental. And the last two
individuals, global players in their own right, directly call for
America’s guiding hand in planetary transformation.
America, however, isn’t the only major agent for
global change. Europe too, and more specifically for the 21st century, the
European Union, is a fantastic factor in the globalization process.
Indeed, Brzezinski calls for America to act with the European Union “for
sustained global political planning.” [9]
Not surprisingly, an American-European approach
to global order already exists under the Transatlantic Alliance heading.
Over the years, this alliance has been greatly shaped by men such as
Brzezinski, Henry Kissinger, and John J. McCloy on the US side – and by
key Europeans such as Paul-Henri Spaak, Jacques Delors and Javier Solana.
Presently this Transatlantic system is comprised
of a myriad of political, military, and economic linkages. Some of its
components include,
- NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)
- OSCE (Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe)
- OECD [10] (Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development), which originally started out as the
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation.
- Various joint commissions and private policy
groups – such as the Trilateral Commission, [11] the Atlantic Council
of the United States, the British American Security Information
Council, and the less well known Streit Council – along with numerous
programs such as the Transatlantic Foreign Policy Discourse.
- Massive business and corporate ties within
aircraft and shipping industries, petroleum and petro-chemical
companies, defense and aerospace ventures, all major automobile
manufacturers, and many more commercial connections.
This last point bears special significance.
Elizabeth Pond, writing for the European Union Studies Association’s U.S.-EU
Relations Project, tells us, “So intertwined have transatlantic companies
become, especially in the past decade, that it is often impossible to tell
if firms are actually ‘American’ or ‘European’.” [12]
For many outside observers, the question arises:
Does this Transatlantic connection represent the Americanization of
Europe, or is Europe shaping America?
Maybe it’s neither. Too often we in North America
perceive such quandaries through nationalistic lenses, instead, when
viewed through the glasses of globalization, a whole new world comes into
focus.
What the Transatlantic ideal ultimately
represents is the “Third Wave” – the route of globalization. As social
scholars Alvin and Heidi Toffler assert, “what is happening now is nothing
less than a global revolution, a quantum leap.” [13]
But please don’t misunderstand: this “global
revolution” is not a seamless process. As one facet of the revolution, the
Transatlantic partnership – like all other relationships – has growing
pains, setbacks, and observable differences. Indeed during the last number
of years, sizeable rifts have occurred between European and American
population segments, especially in light of Middle Eastern developments.
[14] Although this fissure is more apparent in the general citizenry and
within certain policy circles, and may even have spill over effects within
Transatlantic markets such as defense spending, [15] it’s a rift that
temporarily detracts from the global reality.
And what is the “global reality”? That America is
on the threshold of having to reshape itself, just as it helped re-shape
post-war Europe, and is now looked upon as the “midwife” of a new global
order.
It’s the shift from nationalism to globalization,
via the European model of regionalism.
Globalization, European Regionalism,
and Anti-Nationalism
Immediately after the close of the Cold War, the
Trilateral Commission – a private policy group comprised of American,
European, and Asian counterparts – released its study, Regionalism in a
Converging World. [16] According to its Introduction,
“…regionalism need not be opposed to globalism.
The world should not have to choose between one or the other. It needs
to live with both. The challenge…is how to channel the forces of
regionalism in directions compatible with and supportive of globalism.”
[17] [italics in original]
It’s important to understand that sponsorship for
regionalism as a step in the globalization process hasn’t just been
confined to the Trilateral Commission and its members. Thankfully, the
many builders of this regional-global order have left their fingerprints
plastered throughout the twentieth century. More significantly, their
motives are also discernable.
Back in 1942, The Brookings Institute released
its report, Peace Plans and American Choices, highlighting a
variety of hopeful post-war concepts for “world order.” Options were
reviewed such as explicit US mastery over international affairs, the
creation of a British-American Alliance, harmonizing world order through a
“Union of Democracies” (which was being touted at the time by Clarence
Streit [18] ), and the collaboration of a larger “United Nations” package.
Regionalism was considered in detail, with the Western Hemisphere, Europe,
and Asia comprising the main blocks.
Arthur Millspaugh, author of the Brookings
report, was candid in his linking of regionalism to the “bigger picture,”
“Such regional arrangements may be considered
either as steps or stages in the evolution of a universal world order,
as substitutes for a universal order, or as something to be combined
with a world-wide system.” [19]
Although the Brookings report focused on the
anticipated aftermath of World War II, the idea of a Europe-State had been
birthed decades earlier. Already in 1914, the first year of The Great War
(WWI), Nicholas Murray Butler – President of Columbia University and later
recipient of the 1933 Nobel Peace Prize – suggested that European
unification and the advent of a supra-national government was needed to
replace the “existing national system.”
“What will be in substance a United States of
Europe, a more or less formal federation of the self-governing countries
of Europe, may be the outcome of the demonstrated failure of the
existing national system to adjust government to the growth of
civilization…
There is no reason why each nation in Europe
should not make a place for itself in the sun of unity which I feel sure
is rising there behind the war-clouds. Europe’s stupendous economic
loss, which already has been appalling and will soon be incalculable,
will give us an opportunity to press this argument home…
…the time will come when each nation will
deposit in a world federation some portion of its sovereignty for the
general good. When this happens it will be possible to establish an
international executive and an international police, both devised for
the especial purpose of enforcing the decisions of the international
court.” [20]
Attempts to promote European integration and
cooperation after The Great War were made. In 1923 the Pan-European Union
was founded, attracting a number of individuals who would later play a
post-Word War II role, including Konrad Adenauer. [21] And France’s
foreign minister, Aristide Briand, envisioned a scheme to organize Europe
around unified lines as opposed to nationalistic tendencies, even bringing
the debate to the League of Nations. [22] None of these campaigns,
however, were generally effective.
Ironically, while the League of Nations and the
Pan-European Union ideas floundered, a type of continental integration
almost occurred via the National Socialist German Worker’s Party – better
known as the Nazis. John Laughland, author of The Tainted Source,
details the extensive European unification platform espoused by the Nazi
leadership, including plans for a Central European Economic Community, a
customs-free market area, and the eventual creation of a European monetary
area. [23] What’s more, as Laughland points out, “Nazi plans for European
integration were as political as they were economic.” [24]
The influence of Nazi-era concepts on European
integration cannot be understated. Stationed in Germany during the early
years of World War II, George F. Kennan, one of the most important
American diplomats of the twentieth century and the first Director of
Policy Planning Staff at the State Department, candidly shared his
observations,
“When stationed in Berlin during the war I had
been struck with the fact that Hitler himself, albeit for the wrong
reasons and in the wrong spirit, had actually accomplished much of the
technical task of the unification of Europe. He had created central
authorities in a whole series of areas: in transportation, in banking,
in procurement and distribution of raw materials, in the control of
various forms of nationalized property. Why, I asked myself, could this
situation not be usefully exploited after an Allied victory? What was
needed was an Allied decision not to smash this network of central
controls when the war was ended but rather to take it over, to remove
the Nazi officials who had made it work, to appoint others (and not
necessarily all non-Germans) in their place, and then to supplement this
physical unification with a new European federal authority. When I
returned from Germany, in 1942, I tried to win understanding for this
idea in the Department of State…” [25]
After the war, Kennan (who was a member of the
Council on Foreign Relations and later in life involved in the Trilateral
Commission) became the US counsellor to the European Advisory Commission
and a primary architect of the Marshall Plan – America’s rebuilding
program for Europe. In his Memoirs, the diplomat noted,
“The United States government, animated
primarily by a belief that something should be done to ‘integrate’ the
economies of the European countries in the interests of economic
recovery, had been adding words of encouragement, if not pressure.” [26]
This immediate post-war “encouragement” was
essentially channeled via the Marshall Plan, with European integration
“tacked on every proposal made in Washington for export to Europe.” [27]
Theodore H. White, a US foreign journalist and
later member of the Council on Foreign Relations, describes the situation
in his book, Fire in the Ashes,
“American’s had, for many years, been loftily
instructing Europeans in the virtues of their own great Union of the
States, and chided Europe on the stupidities of its rivalries and
separatisms. During the war several American brain trusters had even
toyed with the idea that, come Liberation, it would be best to sweep
away all currencies of the Liberation countries and replace them with
one new common European currency issued by the United States Army…” [28]
White continued,
“It was the Marshall Plan that hardened
American convictions that Europeans must unite…When visiting Congressmen
asked the Marshall Planners what they were trying to do, they would
answer, ‘We’re trying to pull them together, we’re trying to integrate
them.’ ‘Integration’ was a convenient word and each successive
delegation asked sternly, ‘How far have you got with integration now?’
as if expecting the Marshall Plan to pull out of its desk drawers a
draft constitution and a design for a European flag.
By 1949, in the second appropriation of the
Marshall Plan, Congress, without debate, set the unification of Europe as
one of the major purposes of the Plan.” [29]
Later in life White would reflect, “The story of
the Marshall Plan, it turned out, began with the Meaning of Money. It was
also about Money and Europe, and Money and the Peace – but above all,
Money and Power and America.” [30]
While the Marshall Plan was operational, three
members of Europe’s Christian Democratic community – Alcide De Gasperi,
Konrad Adenauer, and Robert Shuman – led the way towards rousing
continental interest in unification. Giving us some insight into the
motivational factors of these three “Fathers of Europe,” R.W. Keyserlingk,
General Manager of the British United Press during the 1940s, writes,
“…all three [had] been formed in their youth by
the Catholic social movements activated by the papal teachings of
Rerum Novarum. They were all deeply religious, fervent patriots but
determined anti-nationalists. All three came from frontier areas of
border disputes and border contacts…This had taught them that only a
Europe as a federation, not Europe torn by hatreds bred by narrow
nationalism, could assure freedom and liberty to their beloved, more
intimate border homelands.” [31] [italics in original]
Demonstrating the depth of this European ideal
within an anti-nationalistic framework and of the subsequent roadmap to
regionalism, Keyserlingk reminds us, “Integration into a federal system,
along political, economic and military lines, involving the sacrifice of
absolute national sovereignty, was their objective.” [32]
How to achieve this objective? The continuity
between assimilation approaches is truly remarkable,
“First, the political line was attempted and
although this proved almost to be putting the cart before the horse, it
had considerable merit for the future. It created the Council of Europe
and the European Parliament…
When the political approach revealed the
insurmountable difficulties of getting down to practical working
measures, Robert Shuman came up with the second possibility, economic
integration; a merging of interlocking interests, the abolition of trade
barriers eliminating economic competition…working out of common policies
for use of the labour market…freedom of movement for workers…and a
gradual strengthening of joint economic policies…” [33]
Through this decided act of economic
amalgamation, which has since borne itself out via the European Union and
Euro currency, Europe became for the rest of the world a recognized model
to advance internationalism above single state interests. This reality was
perceived early on by European federalists and is evident in the 1946
Hertenstein Program,
“A European Community on federal lines is a
necessary and essential contribution to any world union…The members of
the European Union shall transfer part of their sovereign rights –
economic, political and military – to the Federation which they
constitute…By showing that it can solve the problems of its destiny in a
federal spirit, Europe will make its contribution to reconstruction and
to the creation of a world community of peoples.” [34]
Less than one year after the Hertenstein
announcement, the “World Movement for World Federal Government” released a
similar platform known as the Montreux Declaration. After stating that
national sovereignty required limitations and that nations needed to
transfer powers to a “world federal government,” the Declaration added,
“We consider that integration of activities at
regional and functional levels is consistent with the true federal
approach. The formation of regional federations – insofar as they do not
become an end in themselves or run the risk of crystallizing into blocs
– can and should contribute to the effective functioning of a world
federal government.” [35]
In the decades immediately following World War
II, Transatlantic ties between Euro-federalists and American elites
broadened international acceptance of a European Community. Moreover,
Europe’s march to amalgamation successfully achieved strategic goals. The
European Coal and Steel Community, the Treaty of Rome and the subsequent
European Economic Community and Euratom agency, and the gradual
harmonization of agricultural and fiscal policies all demonstrated the
strength of this trans-national agenda.
By the time the 1970s rolled around with its OPEC
petroleum crisis and the revamping of the Bretton Woods financial system,
the opportunities regionalism offered as a tool for global transformation
was clearly evident. The Trilateral Commission, the Club of Rome, and the
Institute for World Order all looked to regionalism as a trump card over
nationalism. [36]
As one of the most prolific advocates of regional
modeling, the Club of Rome – an elite body acting as a “global catalyst of
change” [37] – deserves special attention. Its report, Mankind at the
Turning Point, envisioned a world zoned into ten different blocs, and
acknowledged that the regional view was necessary for global development.
[38] In another report released during this same time period, the Club of
Rome merged the steering of world change, anti-nationalism, and regional
cooperation.
“In the present international order huge power
is concentrated in individualized nation-States. Seen from a world
viewpoint, this must be deemed undesirable. Some of the means which
could be employed to attain those objectives of vital importance to the
international community can more effectively be handled by higher levels
of decision-making…the achievement of some aims, such as the creation of
larger markets through regional and sub-regional cooperation (collective
self-reliance), would be facilitated by decision-making on a level
higher than the nation-State.” [39]
Richard A. Falk, a Professor of International Law
with connections to the Council on Foreign Relations and the World
Federalist Association, postulated similar directives in the mid-1970s.
Contributing to the World Order Model’s Project (a program of the
Institute for World Order), he wrote that,
“…regionalism has considerable appeal as a
world order half-way house. It seems more feasible in the near term as a
step beyond state sovereignty that can be used to dilute nationalist
sentiments during a period when global loyalties need to grow stronger.”
[40]
Falk had seen the handwriting on the wall less
than a decade earlier. Touching on the increasing role of regional
institutions and the United Nations as it related to global transitional
strategies, he offered an interesting perspective to the World Law Fund’s
Strategy of World Order program: “The result of these challenges to the
traditional international legal system is to create a situation of
transitional crisis. For the inadequacies of the old order have given rise
to the beginnings of a new order…” [41]
Today, global elites from both Europe and America
consider regionalism to be a prime stratagem for global governance. In
fact, this “new regionalism” is now embraced by a multitude of key
individuals, organizations, and governmental agencies. As two United
Nations University document released in 2005 state,
“…regional governance is not incompatible with
and does not negate global governance. On the contrary, it has the
potential to strengthen global governance. The regional logic has always
been inherent to the global body…” [42]
And,
“Regional integration between sovereign
states…is a booming phenomenon, and, not surprisingly, it is nowadays
seen as a process that, together with globalization, challenges the
existing Westphalian [Ed., nation-centered] world order.” [43]
American Choices and World Realities
Nations-states will not go away, either under
regionalism or through some form of global governance. Roles, functions
and the sovereign status of nations, however, will be fundamentally
altered. But the “country,” like state/provinces and city/local
governments, will remain intact. Just add another layer to the pile –
after all, it’s the Third Wave style of global transformation.
As social engineers Alvin and Heidi Toffler
reminds us, “Change so many social, technological and cultural elements at
once and you create not just a transition but a transformation, not just a
new society but the beginnings, at least, of a totally new civilization.”
[44]
Globalization and regionalism go hand-in-hand,
and the relevancy of this is extraordinary. Currently, the EU is assisting
in the creation of new regional blocs around the world: including the Gulf
Cooperation Council, an Asian zone, the development of the South American
Community of Nations, and new blocs in Africa, Latin America and the
Caribbean.
One 2004 EU document spells out this strategy,
“Because of its history and its own integration
process, support for regional integration is an area in which the EU has
real added value to contribute. The EU is ready to share this unique
experience with other world regional groupings. It also hopes to help
them draw on the substantial gains made in the regional integration
process. It therefore encourages other countries in the world to forge
even stronger links with their neighbours and to organize themselves
within institutionalised regional organisations.” [45]
In discussing its own enlargement we can,
moreover, catch a glimpse of what the EU envisions: “Enlargement
strengthens the role and position of the Union in the world, in external
relations, security, trade and in other domains relating to world
governance.” [46] And, “In political terms, by adding to the power,
cohesion and influence of the Union on the international arena,
enlargement strengthens the Union’s hand when it comes to globalisation…”
[47]
What does this have to do with the United States
of America? Everything.
At the financial level, the US has to monetarily
and economically compete with the European Union and its Euro currency.
This competition not only impacts America’s trading power with Europe
directly, but the growing influence of the Euro around the world raises
the stakes even higher. In 2004, Toshihiko Fukui, a board member with the
Bank for International Settlements, noted; “Today, we can discuss the
euro’s potential to bring a sea change to the global financial
architecture, without being criticized for fantasizing.” [48] Fukui then
talked of a time when, like the European Union, Asia too will work as an
economic bloc with a single powerful, globally recognized currency. [49]
The Euro’s importance as a rival to the US
dollar, and as a model for other currency zones, cannot be ignored. And as
different regions develop – with the possibilities of China, India, and
Brazil becoming natural magnets for the creation of massive
economic/regional power blocs – America, with its debt loads expanded
beyond comprehension and its dollar losing face internationally, finds
itself treading economically dangerous waters.
But there’s one other element added to this mix.
As stated earlier, the European Union is involved in creating other
competitive regional blocs. Not only does this cause a deflection in US
dollar strength at the international level, it also shifts foreign
interests away from the US and back to Europe. Hence American influence,
especially in terms of advancing US interests abroad, weakens as Europe’s
influence grows.
These facts haven’t escaped US policy makers. The
irony is that America’s answer is to follow Europe’s footsteps, blending
domestic realities with regional/global trends, and try to assist foreign
nations to integrate under US guidance. The paradox deepens: America, in
order to counter the Europe it helped establish, now has to create a North
American Community incorporating itself, Canada, and Mexico into a new
super-region. However, this is only a paradox to those in America who view
the US through nationalist lenses, as already witnessed, its elite view
things very differently.
North American integration isn’t a pie-in-the-sky
idea. It’s been batted around by a host of privileged tri-national
organizations, including the Canadian Council of Chief Executives
(Canada’s top business leaders), the Mexican Council on Foreign Relations,
the Center for Strategic and International Studies (a Washington DC think
tank with Trilateralist Brzezinski playing a key role), and the New York
Council on Foreign Relations.
In the spring of 2005, the CFR came out with an
“independent task force” report titled Building a North American
Community. This document details an economic and security mandate that
binds North America by establishing a common security perimeter, a North
American border pass program, common external tariffs, the seamless
movement of goods, full mobility of labor between Canada and the US, a
continental energy platform, and the creation of a single economic
tri-national region; with 2010 as a target date for many of these
arrangements. [50]
Responding to this report, the US Embassy in
Canada – “pointing to increased competition from the European Union and
raising economic powers such as India and China” – called the CFR’s agenda
a “blueprint for a powerhouse North American trading area.” [51]
A few short weeks after the CFR announced that
its upcoming integration report would go public, [52] US President Bush,
Mexican President Fox, and Canadian Prime Minister Martin met in Texas to
announce a tri-national agenda to “ensure that North America remains the
most economically dynamic region of the world.” [53] The Council on
Foreign Relations final report directly acknowledged this tri-national
leadership summit, and pointedly said that, “The Task Force is pleased to
provide specific advice on how the partnership can be pursued and
realized.” [54] And tucked into the taskforce chairman’s statement was a
simple but vital comment; the “process of change must be properly
managed.” [55]
This wasn’t anything new to the banking
community. In 1991, the Dallas Federal Reserve issued a research paper
titled, North American Free Trade and the Peso: The Case for a North
American Currency Area. [56] In the late 1990’s the Bank of Canada
published a string of working papers looking at the pros and cons of a
North American economic and monetary zone. [57] One US Treasury Department
official, outlining world financial trends at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Atlanta in October 2000, candidly remarked that “a quantum increase in
global economic and financial cooperation” would be needed to meet future
international challenges,
“Successful globalization requires a parallel
international process of harmonization of rules, including rules
governing the financial system, a process that has been going on largely
silently for many years in the central banking community…
…I believe that it is at least possible that in
the years ahead we will witness a dramatic decline in the number of
independent currencies in the world…I would not like to put a time frame
on an evolution to a world with substantially fewer currencies, but I am
sure you have noted that the president elect of Mexico, Vincente Fox,
has suggested a long-term evolution towards a North American currency
area. Such trends may lead to new challenges and institutions in the
area of international economic cooperation.” [58]
Regionalism as a stepping-stone to globalization
is the inseparable blending of politics and economics across the board. On
the “political side,” consider what Richard N. Haass had to say when he
was the Director of the Policy Planning Staff at the US Department of
States back in 2002 (remember George F. Kennan was its first director).
“There clearly is a consistent body of ideas
and policies that guides the Bush Administration’s foreign policy.
Whether these ideas and policies will evolve into a formal doctrine with
a name, I’ll leave to history to decide. But this coherence exists and
can be captured by the idea of integration.
In the 21st century, the principle aim of
American foreign policy is to integrate other countries and
organizations into arrangements that will sustain a world consistent
with U.S. interests and values.
…Integration is about bringing nations together
and then building frameworks of cooperation and, where feasible,
institutions that reinforce and sustain them even more.
…Integration reflects not merely a hope for the
future, but the emerging reality of the Bush Administration.” [59]
Haass should know. Not only is he a member of the
Trilateral Commission, he’s the President of the Council on Foreign
Relations. In fact, Haass wrote the forward to the CFR report, Building
a North American Community.
The bottom line is this: Just as politics and
economics are bonded at the hip, regionalism and all it entails –
including the unification of North America – fits part-and-parcel with the
strategy of globalization. It’s the pursuit of the Third Wave global
society as a replacement to the archaic world of nationalism.
In conclusion, the question must be asked; How
far will this process reach? Alvin and Heidi Toffler let the
cat-out-of-the-bag.
“The fact is that building a Third Wave
civilization on the wreckage of Second Wave institutions involves the
design of new, more appropriate political structures in many nations at
once. This is a painful yet necessary project that is mind-staggering in
scope…
In all likelihood it will require a protracted
battle to radically overhaul the United States Congress, the House of
Commons and the House of Lords, the French Chamber of Deputies, the
Bundestag, the Diet, the giant ministries and entrenched civil services
of many nations, their constitutions and court system – in short, much
of the unwieldy and increasingly unworkable apparatus of existing
representative governments.
Nor will this wave of political struggle stop
at the national level. Over the months and decades ahead, the entire
‘global law machine’ – from the United Nations at one end to the local
city or town council at the other – will eventually face a mounting,
ultimately irresistible demand for restructuring.
All of these structures will have to be
fundamentally altered, not because they are inherently evil or even
because the are controlled by this or that class or group, but because
they are increasingly unworkable – no longer fitting to the needs of a
radically changing world.” [60]
Can’t you hear it? That’s the sound of the
crucible of globalization being fired up.
Endnotes:
[1] Björn Hettne, “Globalization, the New
Regionalism and East Asia,” Globalism and Regionalism (Selected
Papers Delivered at the United Nations University Global Seminar '96
Shonan Session, 2-6 September 1996, Hayama, Japan).
[2] For one example of this global governance
calling see Our Global Neighborhood by The Commission on Global
Governance, 1995. See also the reports from the Montreal Global
Governance conference series, hosted by Forum International de
Montreal.
[3] Mikhail Gorbachev, The Search for a New
Beginning: Developing a New Civilization (HarperSanFrancisco,
1995), p.26.
[4] Scott Nearing, United World (Island
Press, 1945), p.221.
[5] Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand
Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives
(Basic Books, 1997), pp.214-215.
[6] Ibid., p.215.
[7] See, James Amon Garrison, Jr.
Biographical Summary, released by Berrett-Koehler Publishers,
attached to its press release on Garrison’s book, America as Empire.
Biographical summary/press release on file.
[8] Jim Garrison, America as Empire: Global
Leadership or Rogue Power? (Berrett-Koehler, 2004), p.9.
[9] Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Choice: Global
Domination or Global Leadership (Basic Books, 2004), p.222.
[10] OSCE is the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development, which originally started as a transatlantic Marshall Plan
tool known as the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, is
predominately an Atlantic-Euro-American body which has grown to
include Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand.
[11] The Trilateral Commission also incorporates
Japanese interests along with American and European players. To read
more about the Trilateral history and its role in the Atlantic
Alliance, see The Trilateral Commission at 25 (Trilateral
Commission, 1998).
[12] Elizabeth Pond, Friendly Fire: The
Near-Death of the Transatlantic Alliance (EUSA, 2004), p.xiii.
[13] See, Alvin and Heidi Toffler, Creating a
New Civilization: The Politics of the Third Wave (Turner
Publishing, 1994/95), p.21.
[14] See Elizabeth Pond, Friendly Fire (EUSA,
2004).
[15] See Terrence R. Guay, The Transatlantic
Defense Industrial Base: Restructuring Scenarios and their
Implications (USArmyWarCollege, Strategic Studies Institute,
2005).
[16] See, Regionalism in a Converging World
(Trilateral Commission/Trilateral Papers #42, 1992).
[17] Ibid., p.3.
[18] Clarence Streit and his book Union Now
were influential forces in shaping the Transatlantic ideal, and
supported a larger vision for NATO. Streit was a Rhode Scholar, an
American delegate to the Conference of Versailles, a New York Times
correspondent at the League of Nations, founder of the Atlantic Union
Committee and the Association to United the Democracies – which has
had close ties to the World Federalist Association. See, Clarence K.
Streit, Union Now (Harper and Brothers, 1940) and Union Now
with Britain (Harper and Brothers, 1941).
[19] Arthur C. Millspaugh, Peace Plans and
American Choices (The Brookings Institute, 1942), p.49.
[20] Nicholas Murray Butler, A World in
Ferment: Interpretations of the War for a New World (Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1918), see the section entitled “The United States of
Europe,” pp.27, 31-32, 36.
[21] Derek W. Urwin, The Community of Europe:
A History of European Integration Since 1945 (Longman, 1991), p.5.
The Austrian aristocrat was Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi.
[22] C. Grove Haines and Ross J.S. Hoffman,
The Origins and Background of the Second World War (Oxford
University Press, 1943), p.265. See also, Urwin, The Community of
Europe, p.6.
[23] John Laughland, The Tainted Source: The
Undemocratic Origins of the European Idea (Little, Brown and
Company, 1997), pp.24 and 30.
[24] Ibid., p.29.
[25] George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950
(Little, Brown and Company, 1967), p.417.
[26] Ibid., p.449.
[27] Theodore H. White, Fire in the Ashes:
Europe in Mid-Century (William Sloane Associates, 1953), p.272.
[28] Ibid., p.271.
[29] Ibid., p.272.
[30] Theodore H. White, In Search of History
(Harper and Row, 1978), p.284.
[31] R.W. Keyserlingk, Fathers of Europe
(Palm Publishers, 1972), pp.2-3.
[32] Ibid., p.137.
[33] Ibid., p.137.
[34] The Hertenstein Programme developed out of
a meeting between European and world federalists, and was hosted by
the Swiss Europa Union Schweiz. The conference was held from September
15-22, 1946.
[35] The Montreux Declaration, August 23, 1947.
[36] For the Trilateral Commission, see their
1974 report, The Crisis of International Cooperation. For the
Club of Rome, see their report, Mankind at the Turning Point.
For the Institute for World Order, see their World Order Models
Project report, On the Creation of a Just World Order (1975).
[37] See About the Club of Rome at
www.clubofrome.org/about/index.php.
[38] Mihajlo Mesarovic and Eduard Pestel,
Mankind at the Turning Point: The Second Report to the Club of Rome
(Club of Rome/Signet, 1974/76), p.39.
[39] Jan Tinbergen (coordinator), RIO:
Reshaping the International Order (Club of Rome, 1976), p.100.
[40] Richard A. Falk, “Toward A New World
Order,” On the Creation of a Just World Order (Institute for
World Order, World Order Model’s Project, 1975), p.229.
[41] Richard A. Falk, “Historical Tendencies,
Modernizing and Revolutionary Nations, and the International Legal
Order,” The Strategy of World Order, Volume 2: International Law
(World Law Fund, 1966), p.180.
[42] Tânia Felício, Managing Security as a
Regional Public Good: A Regional-Global Mechanism for Security
(United Nations University-CRIS Occasional Paper, 2005). See the
section, “Security as a Regional Public Good,” third last paragraph.
[43] Luk Van Langenhove and Ana-Cristina Costea,
Inter-regionalism and the Future of Multilateralism (United
Nations University – CRIS Occasional Paper, 2005), p.10.
[44] Alvin and Heidi Toffler, Creating a New
Civilization, p.29.
[45] European Commission, The European Union,
Latin America and the Caribbean: A Strategic Partnership, 2004,
p.32.
[46] Ibid., p.34.
[47] Ibid., p.35.
[48] Toshihiko Fukui, Governor of the Bank of
Japan, “The Euro-Dollar Regime and the Role of the Yen – Their Impact
on Asia,” speech given at the 13th International Monetary Symposium,
12 November 2004. Speech can be accessed via the BIS.
[49] Ibid.
[50] The full report can be accessed via the
Council on Foreign Relations website (www.cfr.og).
[51] Press Release; “Task Force Urges Measures
to Strengthen North American Competitiveness, Expand Trade, Ensure
Border Security,” Embassy of the USA in Canada, Ottawa. This press
release can be accessed via the US Embassy in Ottawa homepage,
www.usembassycanada.gov.
[52] This pre-release announcement received
virtually no media coverage in the US, although it was a top story in
Canada, making all the news wire services and national television
broadcasts.
[53] “Joint Statement by President Bush,
President Fox, and Prime Minister Martin, Security and Prosperity
Partnership of North America” (www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/03/20050323-2.html).
[54] Building A North American Community,
p.3.
[55] Creating a North American Community,
Chairman’s Statement, Council of Foreign Relations, 2005, p.5.
[56] Darryl McLeod and John H. Welch, North
American Free Trade and the Paso: The Case for a North American
Currency Area, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Research Paper
#9115, August 1991.
[57] Three examples are: Canada’s Exchange
Rate Regime and North American Economic Integration (1999), The
Exchange Rate Regime and Canada’s Monetary Order (1999), and
Why Canada Needs a Flexible Exchange Rate (1999).
[58] Treasury Assistant Secretary for
International Affairs, Edwin M. Truman, Remarks at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Atlanta, October 12, 2000. Speech can be accessed through the
US Treasury Department website.
[59] Richard N. Haass, “Defining U.S. Foreign
Policy in a Post-Post-Cold War World,” speech given to the Foreign
Policy Association, New York, April 22, 2002.
[60] Alvin and Heidi Toffler, Creating a New
Civilization, p.91.